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The Assumption Problem
by Timothy Eller
(te02816@georgiasouthern.edu)

How do you know which assumptions in
life to question? If you try and think about it,
how can you ever really answer it without
overturning new assumptions to question? I
don't seem to be able to; and it doesn't seem
wise to just question all my assumptions all
the time. My mental experiments suggest
that I tend to focus on trivial and dull matters
more often than not when I indiscriminately
question. I tend to never arrive at a
meaningful statement, or all meaning gets
lost anyway. I think you have to allow your
instinct to guide your questions, and that
does mean mistakes will happen, but it seems
we will at least get sharper instincts with
experience. And if that's the best we can do,
there is no real compromise to intellectual
integrity I think.

The Set Assumption:
What is a Set?
by Timothy Eller

A set is usually defined as a formal
collection or category of mathematical
objects, we call the objects contained in a set
its elements.
I think sets (and the assumption of sets
even when one isn’t thinking about sets) help
us to formulate things very specifically and
clearly.

What is a set?
A set is a primitive concept, something
taken to exist for granted within the
deductive system of mathematics.
What is a concept?
Is this a psychological phenomenon?
It is something abstract, it is an entity.
And so the ontological status of concepts is
intimately related to that of any other
abstract entity, and we may want to consider
this broader context before deciding anything
about concepts, and also sets.
Are abstract entities in general only
psychological phenomena?
What is an entity?
What makes something abstract?
Let’s table that issue for now. I think we
have some intuitive idea about what an entity
is and what existence means. We will take
some of that sort of thing for granted, and
then examine the question we came here to
think about. I realize this is in a way kicking
things down the line; we are still ultimately
accepting some primitive ideas and concepts.
I realize this is somewhat philosophically
irresponsible; our terms are not well-defined.
However, I’m not sure you have a better
option. Further, if it were the case that we
could come up with a more solid foundation
for this discussion, I would consider that a
discussion topic in its own right, and I think it
would take up all the time we have.

Don’t different philosophers have different
opinions about existence on a fundamental
level that would affect how they might
perceive and define sets, concepts, and
abstract ideas? Perhaps we should take on
some different metaphysical positions, ones
already well developed, and see what they
have to say about these questions. Certainly,
some of them will be very relevant. However,
I’m not sure we have the patience to do
research for this. So, let’s just start with what
Stephen Barker in Philosophy of Mathematics
(1964) listed as the three main positions
regarding ontology of abstract entities
•

Nominalism is the position that abstract
entities exist in name only.

•

Conceptualism is the position that
abstract entities exist, but they are
mental constructs.

•

Platonism is the position that abstract
entities exist, in at least as real a sense as
anything
else,
independently
of
intelligent agents.

I have some thoughts to share before we
start something new: In practice, we talk
about and think about a set like a location.
This conceptualization makes sense if we take
an unnominalistic stance in regard to the
ontology of math objects; viz., if we don’t
consider them to exist in name only. For, if a
place has nothing in it, it must be nothing at
all. From this position, we think of
mathematics as a system that creates
meaning and understanding about our world,
instead of just a set of algorithms for
producing theorems and rules.
Here’s a thought. Can a set be a concept or
entity beyond the mathematical, or at least
beyond what the axioms capture? I think
biology provides us with examples of this
more general idea of sets. I’m thinking
species. Any category such as biology,
philosophy, or art, is an example of a more
general idea of a set. But I guess that is true

even of a set like {1,2,3}. Does this set contain
the concepts of those number? Is the set the
collection of those entities which are like
Plato’s forms of those numbers? Is this just
notation?
The mention of notation reminds me of a
quick aside. When we picture a set, we
impose an order on it. We can’t think about
sets without parsing through their elements
linearly, like they’re on a conveyor belt, unless
we are referring to a defining property of the
set.
We can also consider a set as a
convenience or a tool. It allows us to talk
about inclusion. It is how we formalize the
context of existence statements. A set is a
phenomenon of framing.
If it is a formalization, does that mean a
set is a human creation?
It may, but I don’t think so. For, a
formalization could be an enframing of
something that exists independently of our
intelligence. Take biology as an example. In its
practice, one deals with organisms and
species and their relations to each other. But,
one generally lacks the assumption that
organisms need our assent and attention to
exist. Notice that if we accept the more
general idea of a set given above, then this
example downright proves we must accept
that the assertion that sets as we speak of
them are formalizations does not imply they
have no existence independently of us.
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